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SUMMARYThe system of multilateral rules and institutions that is currently
responsible for global economic governance is in a sorry state. In the
coming months, Europe will be faced with important decisions about the
future of this system.  The EU should not wait before proposing and initia-
ting reforms. Europe has a large stake in the multilateral system and has
considerable experience in designing effective institutions, making it well
placed to lead a reform agenda. Moreover, the legitimacy of the EU in the
eyes of its citizens depends on its ability to tackle the big issues that really
matter for the future of the global economy. 
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Global economic governance matters.
Since the US at present appears less
ready to move it forward, European
policymakers must take responsibility
for advancing the reform agenda.
Reforms are especially needed in areas
such as trade, finance and the environ-
ment. Specifically, the EU should act
now to unlock the stalled global trade
negotiations, push for badly needed
governance reforms at the IMF and the
World Bank, and take the lead in
addressing the problem of global war-
ming. However, the EU is unlikely to be
successful unless it first gets its own
house in order and makes changes
both to its internal governance and to
the way that Europe is represented in
international forums. 
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GOVERNANCE of the global economy
used to be an issue for the future. It
has become a pressing matter and
signs of this tectonic shift are eve-
rywhere:
  In July 2006 global trade negotia-
tions under the aegis of the World
Trade Organisation were suspended.
This developement highlights the
added complexity implied by the
increase in the number of key players
in the negotiations, and indicates the
difficulty of delivering on the multila-
teral front. What could in the past be
solved bilaterally between the US and
the EU requires more demanding
compromises involving developed,
emerging and developing countries. 
   The two global institutions long
seen as most effective, the
International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, are struggling to adapt to
new realities. They have both lost rele-
vance. The IMF’s core business of
conditional financial assistance is
threatened by Asian disaffection and
Latin American detachment, and its
attempted resurrection as a venue for
managing global current account
imbalances is a high-risk gamble. The
World Bank has been largely crowded
out from project lending to emerging
countries by the development of
financial markets. Furthermore,
conditional debt relief to poor coun-
tries is being undermined by a new
wave of unconditional bilateral cre-
dits from China and elsewhere. Both
institutions are also sorely in need of
further governance reform to
enhance the participation and voice
of emerging economies.
   Almost ten years after it was
signed, the Kyoto Protocol on global
warming is still rejected by the US and
major emerging economies and even
those countries that support it make
insufficient efforts to enforce it at
home. 
   The shifting supply and demand
patterns for fossil fuels, water and
other natural resources create scope
for new tensions, but no meaningful
international response has emerged
to establish proper-functioning mar-
kets and avert the risk of tension. On
the contrary, national governments in
developed and emerging countries
have recently been busy securing
access to oil fields through the streng-
thening of bilateral links with produ-
cing countries. 
This situation raises major, perhaps
unprecedented policy challenges. Yet
the balance of economic and political
power makes addressing these chal-
lenges more difficult than at any time
in recent decades. Under US leader-
ship, global economic governance
was a stable and relatively simple
game with few players. It is made
much more unstable and complex by
the rise in the number and diversity of
players, the growing weight of new
economic powers, and increasing US
scepticism about ‘foreign entangle-
ments’. 
Given its economic size and expe-
rience, the EU has an important
potential role to play in the reform of
global governance. Europeans, howe-
ver, have mixed feelings about it.
On the one hand, they see themselves
as supporters of strong global rules
and effective international institu-
tions, and are more comfortable than
others with the implied limitations to
sovereignty. Having established a
system of supranational governance
at the regional level, Europeans see
global governance as a natural exten-
sion, and regard the EU as a labora-
tory for what the world of tomorrow
could look like. 
On the other hand, they remain reluc-
tant to exercise leadership and ini-
tiate reform. Even though the EU has
been enterprising on trade and global
warming, its actual policy record in
1. THE MALAISE OVER
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The global economy of the early 21st
century has little in common with that
of the early 1980s, when a collection of
integrating, but still highly segmented
national economies coexisted with
quasi-autarkic blocks (China, India, the
Soviet Union and its satellites) repre-
senting about half the total world popu-
lation. The world today has even less in
common with the even more fragmen-
ted world of the early post-World War II
period, when a few countries started
rebuilding the world trade and mone-
tary regime. Yet the global economic
governance regime – the set of global
rules that govern international econo-
mic relations, the network of institu-
tions that support and enforce those
relations and the processes that steer
change in this system – has not under-
gone a parallel transformation.
Although institutions created 60 years
ago have adapted, there is a clear dis-
connect between economic and insti-
tutional developments. This applies
“Europeans tend to
regard the EU as a
laboratory for what
the world of tomor-
row could look like.”
those fields is mixed at best. Europe
has generally been a follower on inter-
national financial matters, its actions
on development assistance are
inconsistent, and it is divided on
many issues such as migration.
Furthermore, the EU’s own complex
governance system raises issues of
internal consensus-building and
external representation that fre-
quently prevent the EU from taking
initiatives.
In the coming months, Europe will be
faced with important decisions about
the future of global economic gover-
nance. The purpose of this brief is to
emphasise the need for clear
European views, to flag some key
strategic questions in this area, and
to outline possible choices along with
their implications. Section 1 looks in
more detail at the problems of global
governance and Section 2 examines
the alternatives to collective action. In
Section 3 we develop the argument in
favour of global governance; and in
Section 4 we outline the choices for
Europe.GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN AGENDA FOR EUROPE
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1See for example the
latest Trade and
Poverty opinion sur-
vey of the German
Marshall Fund of the
United States,
www.gmfus.org/trade. 
2For IMF and World
Bank, "membership"
gives the proportion
of EU27 countries in
total member coun-
tries; "votes" their
share in the total
quota-based votes;
"control" the propor-
tion of votes they
control, assuming
decisions within a 
circumscription are
taken by simple
majority on the basis
of the members'
votes in the IMF, 
and "seats", average
number of chairs held
by EU member coun-
tries in the Executive
Board (taking rota-
tions into account),
divided by the total
number of chairs.
3 The G20 is a group
consisting of 19 of
the world’s largest
economies, together
with the European
Union. Its primary
goal is to discuss and
develop policies that
promote the “high
and sustainable
growth” of the global
economy.
also to the power balance within them
(Table 1).
Against this background, two recent
trends affecting the world economy are
especially noteworthy. On the one
hand, there are signs of renewed eco-
nomic nationalism in the US, some
European countries, and parts of the
emerging world. Partly as a result of
the emergence of new global players,
public opinion in the US and France, for
example, is turning away from reliance
on the multilateral regime.
1 These new
economic powers also have a different
attitude towards multilateralism. The
main players after World War II, the US,
Europe and Japan, had been traumati-
sed by nationalist hubris. China, India
and Brazil do not share the same histo-
rical experience and can easily per-
ceive multilateral commitments as
excessive constraints on policies that
should be inspired by national interest.
The emergence of new global powers
has also rekindled the fear of resource
scarcity, especially in the area of
energy. 
On the other hand, regional initiatives
have blossomed. The evolution is well
documented for trade because all
regional agreements have to be noti-
fied to the WTO. However, regionalism is
by no means limited to trade, nor is
Europe its main player as it once was.
Today, regionalism is alive on all conti-
nents, but most remarkably in Asia. The
advance of Asian regional integration
is notable not only for its breadth but
also for the fact that it is explicitly
regarded by participants as an alterna-
tive to reliance on global institutions. At
the time of the Asian crises in 1997-
1998, the proposal for an Asian
Monetary Fund was blocked by the
Group of Seven, and countries in crisis
were directed to the IMF instead. Since
then, East Asian countries have been
negotiating among themselves a
series of regional monetary and finan-
cial cooperation agreements. Even
though this cooperation has not yet
been wholly tested, regionalism has
become a fact that cannot be simply
ignored or opposed by the supporters
of multilateralism. 
These two trends partly explain the
malaise over global governance, but its
fundamental causes are to be found
elsewhere. First, the diversity of prefe-
rences within the world economy has
increased dramatically. Global gover-
nance traditionally involves a trade-off
between economies of scale and diffe-
rences in preferences. The more
diverse countries are, the less they
tend to agree on devolving policy res-
ponsibilities to a supranational entity.
Yet beyond the increase in the number
of players (Figure 1, overleaf), diffe-
rences in historical backgrounds and
development levels are bound to result
in differences in preferences. This sim-
ply increases the cost of agreeing on a
common response and makes com-
promise on any subject much more
difficult, even when increased interde-
pendence simultaneously increases
the benefits of cooperation. 
Second, among countries of unequal
development level, many global issues
involve an international distributional
dimension that compounds the diffi-
culty of reaching agreement. Even
when it is a positive-sum game overall,
there are losers as well as winners.
This is obviously the case for debt
relief, but is true also for trade liberali-
sation, since countries benefiting from
existing preferential trade agreements
are bound to lose from an alignment of
trade tariffs. This also applies to poli-
cies designed to tackle global environ-
mental challenges, for which equity
issues are compounded by the inter-
temporal dimension.  The prime objec-
tion of emerging countries to curbing
greenhouse gas emissions is that
developed countries had a free ride on
the global environment in the previous
stages of their development. 
Third, globalisation is divisive within
developed and developing societies.
The extent of its contribution to the rise
of within-country inequality and job
insecurity is an open question, but the
most basic models of integration
through trade, capital flows and migra-
tion point to distributional effects that
create winners and losers.
Furthermore, many people, rightly or
wrongly, regard global institutions as
the source of globalisation itself and of
its harmful consequences.
Institution No. of members Current-$ GDP  PPP-based GDP Population
2005
(Billions $)
2005
(Billions$) (Millions)
EU Total EU Total EU Total EU Total
WTO 28 150 13,425 42,289 12,892 56,510 488 5,766
Share (%) 18 100 31 100 22 100 8 100
IMF/ 27 184 13,425 43,861 12,892 60,252 488 6,351
World Bank
2
Shares (%):
membership 15 100 30 100 21 100 7 100
votes 32
control 33
seats 30
G8 4 8 8,807 27,647 7,841 26,816 260 860
Share (%) 50 100 31 100 29 100 30 100
G20
3 5 20 8,807 35,096 7,841 46,521 260 4,019
Share (%) 25 100 25 100 16 100 6 100
memo:
UN 27 192 13,425 43,942 12,892 60,339 488 6,384
Share (%) 14 100 30 100 21 100 7 100
Table 1
Weight of the EU-27 in international economic and financial institutions
Source: Bruegel calculations. For GDP and population data: World Development Indicators
database, World Bank andthe World Factbook, CIA.  Data for Myanmar are missing.b
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN AGENDA FOR EUROPE
Finally, the end of the Cold War has
removed a powerful incentive to collec-
tive action. The change in attitude of
the United States, which is now more
inclined to adopt a multi-track strategy
that includes regional
agreements and uni-
lateral initiatives as
alternatives to the
multilateral route, has
probably less to do
with economic fac-
tors than with politi-
cal factors. The US
position in the world
economy is less
dominant today than
at the end of World War II when it spear-
headed the multilateral system. But it
is on the political side that the most
important shift has taken place. In the
e y e s  o f  m a n y  U S  p o l i c y m a k e r s ,  U S
national security no longer calls for
cementing an economic coalition of
states in the way it did in the Cold War
period. As scholars of international
relations often say, the Cold War glue
has gone.
4 Interestingly, the so-called
war on terror has not, so far, rested on
a system of economic alliances that
bind countries together. 
National leadership
Countries holding a dominant posi-
tion may set de facto rules for the
global economy. This is typically the
case for standards, where the United
States and the European
Union play a dominant
role largely because of
their size. The US has
generally taken the lead
in financial matters,
whereas the EU has
been a dominant player
in certain product stan-
dards. On competition
matters, the EU often
exercises leadership on
mergers, while the US does the same
on abuse of dominant position. 
However, rules based on the “bene-
volent hegemony” of one player are
often not sustained over the long
term. The hegemon may succumb to
the temptation to use its position to
serve its own short-term national
interest, thereby inviting followers to
seek alternative strategies. This is
illustrated both by the recent ten-
dency of many countries, including
those of the EU, to endorse
International Financial Reporting
Standards as an alternative to US
accounting rules, and by the growing
unease in the US about EU-originated
product regulation. 
Market-based rules
Markets have an ability to self-orga-
“The end of the
Cold War has
removed a power-
ful incentive to
collective action.”
Source: WTO
Figure 1
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nise without the direct involvement
of international institutions and are
generally faster in designing and
reforming arrangements. Private-
sector global governance regimes
are a significant component of global
rule-making in financial markets and
other areas. This does not need to be
regarded as a threat to the multilate-
ral system. Governance through mul-
tilateral institutions and rules can
coexist with market self-organisa-
tion and can even find positive
synergies with it. Yet this does repre-
sent a challenge as slow-moving
public institutions need to adapt to
the emergence of competing, often
more agile forms of governance.   
Regionalism
Regional institutions among coun-
tries sharing similar preferences can
be a solution to the problem created
by differences in preferences bet-
ween countries, even when there are
global externalities. To the extent
that the rules adopted at regional
levels are mutually compatible and
regional governing institutions are in
dialogue with each other, the need
for a global framework may be redu-
ced. Moreover, the contrast between
global and regional approaches is
probably not as sharp as it is gene-
rally portrayed. Rarely, if at all, are
international externalities either
purely global or purely regional. To
the extent that externalities are both
regional and global, they need to be
addressed at both levels simulta-
neously. 
How this is done in practice varies
greatly across subject matters. Take
the case of health. All communicable
diseases have a global dimension
and therefore require global solu-
tions. However, many also have an
important region-specific dimension.
It makes sense, therefore, that the
World Health Organisation is, in fact,
a network that comprises a global
headquarters and six regional offices
dispersed across the world. There is
no equivalent situation in the field of
economic governance. The IMF, the
World Bank and the WTO have no
regional office to which member
countries are affiliated and which
2. THREE POTENTIAL 
ALTERNATIVES
A world economic system governed
by global rules and institutions is by
no means the only route. There are at
least three alternatives: 
4Frieden (2006) 
elaborates from a US
perspective on the
links between global
economic integration
and political and 
security dimensions.GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN AGENDA FOR EUROPE
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3. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
MATTERS
Global governance should not be
considered as the only possible way
to manage globalisation. Nor can it
be dismissed, however, because
there are issues that call for global
collective action. This is obviously
the case where there are important
global externalities, such as for the
global environment, global epide-
mics and global financial crises. In
this respect, the current regime of
global economic governance is
incomplete in several important
areas. 
In a more subtle way, multilateral
rules and institutions, though they
may be painful to negotiate among a
large number of countries with
diverse domestic conditions, offer
three advantages even when global
externalities are only moderate. 
First, they ensure more security
than ad hoc arrangements. In time of
stress, rules provide core principles
to which to refer and represent
legally enforceable commitments.
Moreover, institutions offer a venue
for settling disputes. A comparison
between trade and FDI may clarify
the point: Global trade is based on
clear principles (such as national
play an executive role. Some form of
regional arrangement exists in each
of the domains pertaining to these
three organisations, but the rela-
tionship between regional arrange-
ments and global institutions is
weak at best. 
Only in the case of the WTO do the
treaties foresee the possibility that
member countries form regional
groupings and insist that they res-
pect certain rules in doing so.
However, those rules are weak and
they are not enforced. They cannot
prevent “the current logjam in the
WTO on regional trade agreements...
[and ensure] that regional trade
agreements become building blocks,
not stumbling blocks to world trade”
(Lamy, 2006).
treatment and the most-favoured-
nation clause); the WTO treaty expli-
citly includes safeguard clauses and
established a dispute settlement
mechanism. All those elements are
lacking for FDI. As a consequence, in
the event of a dispute over a takeo-
ver, there can be no reference to uni-
versally accepted principles, no
recourse to exceptional conditions,
and no neutral venue for arbitration.
This leaves the prevention of unilate-
ral action and retaliation to the sole
wisdom of the states. 
In other words, strong rules and legi-
timate institutions may help to
ensure the resilience of global eco-
nomic integration. They are certainly
no panacea, and their ability to resist
pressure should not be overestima-
ted. But in times of crisis and threats
to economic integration, rules and
institutions provide a valuable res-
ponse. 
Second, global institutions give a
voice to countries of all sizes and are
accountable to these countries.
Critics may complain about the dis-
tribution of votes and seats and
about the lack of effective accounta-
bility, but global institutions ensure
a degree of fairness and ownership
which most other solutions lack. In
this way, they contribute to the sta-
bility of economic integration. This
stability, however fragile, would be
lacking in a multi-polar world in
which integration would be driven by
big countries and private initiatives,
without the legitimacy that is provi-
ded by global rules and institutions.  
Third, institutions are a form of capi-
tal because, by relying on founding
principles and internal governance
rules, they help tackle new issues as
they emerge. Institutions help to
lower negotiation costs and avoid
the long and painful process of defi-
ning a collective response. Well-des-
igned and well-governed institutions
are therefore an asset for all partici-
pants in the world economy. 
Global public goods are subject to the
free-rider problem, however,  since
their benefits are generally available
to everyone. Although everyone
would be better off if countries
agreed to provide global public
goods, it is normally in the interests
of individual countries to let others
bear the cost. The result is that glo-
bal institutions are difficult to set up
and maintain. The aftermath of World
War II was an exceptional set of cir-
cumstances that served as a cata-
lyst for building both the multilateral
system and regional institutions
Europe. In Asia, the 1997-1998
financial crises seem to have played
a similar, albeit more limited role.
“For FDI, the preven-
tion of unilateral
action and retaliation
is left to the sole wis-
dom of the states.”
“Global public goods
are subject to the
free-rider problem; it
is normally in the
interests of indivi-
dual countries to let
others bear the cost.”
4. THE CHOICES FOR EUROPE
Because global economic gover-
nance is in a state of flux and hard
choices are looming, the European
Union needs clarity of vision. The
policy implications of our analysis
can be summarised into five main
points. 
A. Global economic governance mat-
ters for Europe 
There could be a sense that the appa-
rent loss of purpose of many global GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN AGENDA FOR EUROPE
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5More precisely, it
was agreed to revise
both the member
countries’ quota
(their participation
in the Fund’s capital,
which also determi-
nes their access to
credit) and their
voting rights (which
closely follow their
quota).  
6Report of the
Managing Director of
the IMF to the
International
Monetary and
Financial Committee,
14 September 2006. 
7Quota and votes are
decided upon by the
184 “governors” of
the Fund (country
representatives).
They are traditionally
adopted by the World
Bank also.  
Box 1: European representation in the Bretton Woods institutions
Governance reform is on the official agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions. In Singapore in September 2006, it was agreed in a first
step to redistribute IMF voting rights
5in favour of four emerging countries (China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey) that were considered subs-
tantially underrepresented. A more comprehensive reform of the quota and voice system, to be completed within two years, was also
begun. Furthermore, the IMF Executive Board has announced that looking beyond this second round of adjustments, “it will be impor-
tant to ensure that quota shares continue to evolve in line with changes in members’ positions in the global economy”. 
6
This realignment is widely seen as implying a reduction in the weight of Europe in the governance of the Fund and the World Bank .
7  There
are several ways of assessing this weight (Table 1), but all lead to the conclusion that the EU-27’s nominal power within those institu-
tions exceeds its share in world GDP and world population. Over the last 20 years, the EU-27’s share in the world economy (in PPP terms)
has declined by five percentage points and it is set to decline further in the years to come. 
Another reason for a rebalancing is that the IMF has been asked to contribute to addressing global imbalances through enhancing “mul-
tilateral surveillance” – that is, through assessing the major countries’ and regions’ policies and exchange rates. To carry out such a
highly challenging task, the IMF needs legitimacy. Yet the Asian countries still recall the financial crises of the late 1990s and what they
then perceived as an inequitable attitude of the Fund and resent that in spite of their growing weight in the world economy, the Bretton
Woods institutions continue to be dominated by the US and Europe – hence a quid pro quo between ensuring the Fund retains a key
economic role and reforming its governance. 
Pressure is therefore mounting for a redistribution of power and the US administration has unambiguously expressed support for such
a move. The EU has an interest in encouraging all countries to rely on the multilateral system. This has revived the issue of European
representation and resuscitated long-standing proposals for either a single EU or euro-area seat. By committing to enter a permanent
coalition, the EU member states, some of which currently belong to non-European constituencies, could increase their effective power. 
The IMF voting rights system makes it possible to measure the effective power of a country or a group of countries by tallying how often
it would be the swing voter in a decision. Effective power obviously depends on nominal power – voting rights – but also on the distri-
bution of voting rights among the other players (for example, having 30% of the voting rights in an assembly means a great deal of effec-
tive power if the other players are small but none if another player holds 50% of the rights). True enough, there are very few instances in
which IMF Executive Directors actually vote. But the underlying power structure serves as a benchmark against which players measure
their influence. The fierce controversies associated with each quota rebalancing are a clear indication that voting weights really matter. 
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2006) finds that, if they were to form a coalition, the EU-25 member countries would be, by far, the dominant
power in the IMF with an effective power index of 48% - the next one being the US with 7%. An important issue, however, is whether indi-
vidual member states would gain or lose from going beyond the forming of a coalition and merging their representation in a single seat. 
A first question is how their quota and votes would be determined. According to the Fund rules, votes are based on a formula that exclu-
des internal trade, which would mechanically reduce the weight of the EU although it would remain bigger than the US. However, it would
be unrealistic to assume that the EU could replace the US as the largest shareholder. In their simulations, Leech and Leech (2005) the-
refore suppose that a single EU seat would have the same voting right as the United States and that all the excess voting rights would
be redistributed uniformly among other countries. This is a realistic assumption which implies that Europe’s nominal power would dimi-
nish by about a third compared with the current situation. What about its effective power? 
Whether or not Europe would gain in effective power depends on the decision mechanism within the EU. Under the assumption that inter-
nal EU decision would be determined by simple majority voting on the basis of current IMF weights, Leech and Leech have shown that
all EU countries would still gain power (Figure 2). However, IMF quotas substantially differ from EU voting weights and a common repre-
sentation of the EU would use voting weights and decision rules as currently defined by the Nice treaty. This would favour Poland, Spain
and the smaller countries whose vote counts more within the EU than in the IMF and disadvantage the bigger member states as well as
some medium-sized countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. But the change of voting system would not amount to a zero-sum
game. The Nice rules involve a qualified majority threshold that renders reaching a common decision notoriously difficult: according to
Baldwin and Widgren (2004), the probability that a randomly selected coalition would command a qualified majority is 2.1% in the EU-
27 against 7.8% in the EU-15 and 21.9% in the original EU-6. 
With a single seat but an inefficient internal voting rule, most EU countries would in fact lose, rather than gain effective power, with the
largest countries losing the most because they would weigh less. But it would be a mistake to consider the issue as a primarily distribu-
tional one. The main problem here is the overall inefficiency of the Nice system, not the relative weights of the EU member states. In fact,
using the Nice voting weights but changing the Nice decision rule from qualified to simple majority (and removing the demographic
threshold) would imply that most EU countries  actually gain power and the losers  would only suffer marginally.
Such calculations should not be taken at face value. What they do indicate, however, is that under the Nice system the large countries
would lose influence in the IMF on issues where the EU is not unanimous (or close to being unanimous). This illustrates that internal
governance matters considerably and that there is little hope the EU can increase its external influence without reforming its internal
governance. This reform was one of the main purposes of the draft constitution, and is one of the main costs of its current abeyance.GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN AGENDA FOR EUROPE
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First, procrastination is a losing stra-
tegy. The longer the EU waits to reco-
gnise that the world has changed,
the smaller its weight in this world
will be. The time for action is now.     
Second, the EU can no longer hide
behind the US. For economic and
political reasons, the US is now less
ready than at any time since World
War II to move global economic
governance forward. It would be
imprudent to assume that this situa-
tion will soon be reversed. Rather,
European policymakers should indi-
cate willingness to take their share
of global responsibilities and build
on this commitment to initiate a
renewed dialogue with the US.
Third, the legitimacy of the EU in the
eyes of its own citizens largely hin-
ges on its ability to tackle global
issues. An EU that has regained legi-
timacy by setting itself an ambitious
agenda on trade, energy, global
finance and climate change will be
better placed to find a solution to the
constitutional conundrum than one
that gets lost in introspection.
C. Reforms are needed
This applies especially to trade,
finance and the environment. The EU
should stand ready to take initiati-
ves to unlock the global trade nego-
tiations. It cannot anymore give pre-
cedence to sectoral interests nor
render its external stance hostage to
internal compromises, especially on
agriculture. 
The Bretton Woods institutions are
another immediate area for reform.
EU member states should be proac-
tive in specifying a mandate for the
EU as a catalyst for reform of the
IMF’s and World Bank’s governance.
This is a necessary, if not sufficient,
condition to ensure the legitimacy of
these institutions, which have
played a helpful and important role
in the past and could do so again in
the future. Against this background,
the case for a single European or,
more realistically, a euro-area seat
at the IMF Board is strong. Within the
framework of an significant reali-
gnment of quota and votes, a unified
representation would actually solve
two problems. It would allow a better
representation of emerging and
developing countries and strengthen
Europe’s influence (see Box 1).
Adhesion to the Kyoto Protocol is not
enough to face the challenges of cli-
mate change. While sticking to its
commitments, Europe should take
the lead in preparing for the emer-
gence of a credible, globally shared
approach to address the causes and
consequences of global warming. 
D. A new architecture
Beyond sectoral steps, the rapidly
shifting balance of economic power
in the world economy may urgently
call for more wide-ranging reforms. 
Figure 2
European Effective Power within the IMF
Source: Bruegel calculations using Leech and Leech software
(www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/) 
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institutions is not a matter of signifi-
cant concern. This would be a costly
mistake for the world and the EU.
Some of the missions of these insti-
tutions have indeed become obso-
lete, but others are more crucial than
ever in the current age of unprece-
dented economic interdependence.
At the same time, although it could
rely on alternative modes of gover-
nance on a case-by-case basis, the
EU would ultimately lose from a
demise of the existing system of glo-
bal rules and institutions. 
B. Time for initiatives 
Europe’s traditional temptation is to
look inward, procrastinate, and fol-
low the US. Europe can no longer
afford to behave in this manner. Regionalism is both a fact and a
natural response to the diversity of
preferences in the world economy. It
is therefore bound to develop further
not only in trade but also in other
areas. But for regionalism to support
rather than undermine multilatera-
lism, safeguards need to be defined.
Being itself the archetype of a strong
and successful regional grouping, as
well as a traditional supporter of the
multilateral system, the EU is ideally
placed to contribute constructively
to this conversation. It should seize
the initiative and exercise leadership
in the definition of guiding principles
for making regional agreements buil-
ding blocks of the multilateral order.
This should apply first and foremost
to its own regional initiatives. 
There is a need for a better political
framework to define global priorities
and coherent policy and institutional
reforms. Specialised institutions
cannot fulfil that role, which has for
the last quarter of a century been ful-
filled by the Group of Seven. However
the G7 does not have the legitimacy
to fulfil this function anymore and
ad-hoc invitations to attend the
head-of-state-level meetings do not
suffice to engage emerging and
developing countries. A better
approach would be the creation of a
permanent grouping at head-of-state
level. An idea worth exploring would
be to shift G7-G8 tasks to the G20
(Linn and Bradford, 2006).
E. External influence requires effi-
cient internal governance
The ability of the EU to act as a global
player is often hampered by its inef-
ficient arrangements for external
representation and internal decision.
Common external representation
does not imply federalisation.
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Member states can retain control
rights through the definition of a
mandate and the supervision of its
implementation (Coeuré and Pisani-
Ferry, 2006). But the reform of the
EU’s external representation requi-
res a definition of the ways in which
various national views are mediated
and the external representatives are
monitored. There would be no point
in aiming at more external influence
while at the same time retaining an
internal system that prevents the EU
from reaching decisions. This high-
lights the need to renew the debate
on constitutional arrangements. The
current framework as it results from
the Nice Treaty, including decision-
making by qualified majority with a
high threshold, does not combine
the features of efficiency and legiti-
macy that are called for to address
today’s and tomorrow’s global chal-
lenges. 
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“There is no point in
aiming at more external
influence while at the
same time retaining an
internal system that
prevents the EUrea-
ching decisions.”